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The pending enlargement of the European Monetary Union (EMU) has brought to the fore the 
discussion of the voting right distribution in the European Central Bank (ECB) council. We 
show that, in a model where labor unions internalize the inflationary consequences of wage 
setting, deviating from a voting scheme based purely on economic size can be beneficial. 
Preliminary evidence on unemployment and voting rights in the ECB council seems broadly 
in line with this idea. We also point to possible policy implications for EMU enlargement and 
ECB restructuring. 
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Voting in the council of the European Central Bank (ECB) is organized according to the “one
country, one vote” principle, with the national central bank governor of, for example,
Luxembourg holding similar voting power as the French governor. This is in remarkable
contrast to the way the number of commissioners in the European Commission is distributed
among EU member countries or the number of representatives in the European Parliament,
both of which are a function of relative population sizes. Without a reform of the ECB
decision-making process, these differences between political and economic weights will
become even more pronounced as most accession countries to the European Monetary Union
(EMU) are relatively small in size.
Misrepresentation of economic size could distort the European perspective of the ECB
council (Berger 2002)—but should a reform of ECB decision making go as far as to fully
abandon the idea of “one country, one vote”? A number of considerations suggest that some
asymmetry in the representation of economic size in the ECB council might have its benefits.
Casella (1992) argues that smaller countries might require a political premium in terms of a
more than proportional weight in common decisions as a precondition to joining a political
union. Thus (some) overrepresentation could be an integral part of EMU itself. Another
argument in favor of asymmetry in representation might be differences in transmission
mechanisms. As pointed out by, among others, De Grauwe (2000), Gros and Hefeker (2002),
and Benigno (2003), it might be advisable to take into account differences in the impact of
monetary policy on real and nominal variables when weighing economic developments in the
euro area. A corollary of this result is that voting rights should under some circumstances
differ from economic size. In addition, the “one country, one vote” principle could help foster
ECB independence by decentralizing the appointment process to the council (Berger 2002).
The present paper stresses another channel to explain over- and under representation
of countries in the ECB’s council: the interaction of monetary policy and labor market2
structure within a currency union. Building on a recent literature exploring the relation
between labor unions and central banks in a closed economy, we show that deviating from a
voting scheme based purely on economic size can be beneficial if unions internalize the
inflationary consequences of wage setting.
1
To illustrate the underlying idea, consider a monetary union with two member
countries of equal size but asymmetric labor market structure—in particular, assume a large
number of  unions in one country (country 1) and very few unions in the other (country 2). If,
for given central bank preferences, the central bank puts greater emphasis on country 1,
monetary policy will attempt to increase inflation to foster employment in country 1. In
anticipation, unions can be expected to moderate their wage demands, thereby lowering real
wages and unemployment in country 1. At the same time, the single union in country 2 will
be increasing wages—but only moderately so. While it has an incentive to increase wages as
the central bank shifts attention to country 1, the union will be cautioned by fears of higher
inflation. As a consequence, inflation in the currency union will be falling; employment in
country 1 could be increasing; and employment in country 2 is likely to be decreasing.
Depending on the prevailing view of the unemployment-inflation trade-off, however, the
overall outcome might improve welfare even in countries where unemployment increases.
This would make a voting scheme that deviates from economic size a beneficial policy option
for all currency area members.
Interestingly, empirical evidence seems to support the notion that the existing
distribution of economic and political weights in the ECB council could be influenced by
similar arguments. There are indications of a negative correlation between unemployment and
voting power in excess of a country’s economic weight.
                                                
1 See, among others, Cukierman and Lippi (1999, 2001), Grüner and Hefeker (1999), Guzzo and Velasco (1999),
Berger et al. (2001).3
These results have implications for ECB reform in light of EMU enlargement. While
the asymmetries between economic and political weight are bound to increase in a larger
monetary union, a too ambitious overhaul of the “one country, one vote” principle might have
disadvantages—at least from the perspective of the new (mostly small) member countries.
Since many accession countries are characterized by competitive labor markets compared to
present EMU members they are bound to benefit from entering EMU with voting rights in
excess of their relative size. On the other hand, with inflation already at rather low levels,
existing members might find that a further reduction in voting rights is not to their advantage.
We proceed as follows: section 2 develops a simple model describing the interaction
between a common central bank and labor unions in a currency union with two member
countries. Sections 3 and 4 derive the influence of relative voting weights in monetary policy
decisions on inflation and labor market outcomes. Section 5 relates these results to observable
labor market characteristics of EMU members and discusses some implications for EMU
enlargement and ECB reform. Section 6 draws some conclusions.
2. The Basic Model
2.1. The Labor Market
We consider two economies (j=1,2) with i=1...nj sectors each in a monetary union. Labor is
sector and country specific. Total labor demand in country j is
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1  is the average wage demand. The market
clearing real wage ( p - i w ) in sector i is normalized to zero. We assume that the rate of
inflation is the same across countries and sectors. The number of labor unions  j n  in each
economy is exogenous and is interpreted as an indicator of the degree of national labor market
competitiveness. A highly decentralized, and thus presumably more competitive, labor market
is characterized by a higher number of unions (Calmfors and Driffill 1988).
2.2. The Monetary Authority
Monetary policy is determined by a central bank council that is composed of a jointly
appointed board (e.g., in the case of the ECB: president, vice-president and four other
members of the ECB directorate) and representatives for each member country in the
monetary union. A common assumption is that the national representatives are driven—to an
important degree—by developments in their national economies.
2
In particular, we assume that national representatives in country j dislike inflation and
unemployment, preferring both to be close to zero. If l > 0 measures their relative preference
for low unemployment, the loss function of representative j can be written as
2 2
j j u L l + p = . (1)
Members of the board are assumed to care for currency union wide developments and
to show no national preferences—perhaps, as in the case of the ECB, because of a supra-
national appointment procedure. The weight that the board assigns to developments in
                                                
2 See, among others, von Hagen and Süppel (1994), Grüner (1999), Berger (2002), Hefeker (2003). Meade and
Sheets (2002) and Berger and de Haan (2002) present preliminary evidence supporting this view.5
country 1, 0 < c < 1, equals its relative economic size. Country 2’s weight is 1 – c. Thus the




2 ] 1 [ u u LB c - + c l + p = , (2)
where we have made the assumption that inflation is the same across the currency union.
Finally, we describe the preferences of the decision making body, the central bank
council, as a weighted combination of the board and the two national representatives:
( ) ( ) [ ] 2 1 1 1 L L b bL L B C g - + g - + = . (3)
The relative political weight of the board is b and the relative weight of each national
representative is  g, with 0 < b, g < 1. Based on the “one country, one vote” principle,  g
would be ½. Note that we impose similar preferences on all the monetary policy makers.
3
Given this preference structure, the rate of inflation that is chosen by the council is
( ) 2 2 1 1 w s w s + q = p (4)
where  ) 1 /( l + l = q ,  g - + c = ) 1 ( 1 b b s  and  ( ) g - - + c - = 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 2 b b s . Note that the
composite weights sj are a function of both the influence of the countries relative to their peers
in the ECB council  g j and the economic weight that the board assigns to this country  cj. The
parameter q < 1 measures the central bank’s reaction to wages in the two economies.
                                                
3 We are only interested in the systematic influence of a country’s political weight in monetary policy decisions.6
2.3. The Labor Unions
In what follows we assume that preferences of all national labor union members are identical.
The objectives of the representative member include high real wages, low inflation, and low
unemployment (see Cukierman and Lippi 1999, 2001, Grüner and Hefeker 1999). With




ij ij ij u
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w U - p - p - =
(5)
Unions are willing to trade in full unemployment for higher real wages. The term 1/a is a
measure of union aggressiveness in this regard. It is determined by the influence of
(employed) labor union insiders relative to outsiders; and it also reflects national labor
legislation because this determines labor turnover costs and rigidities and thus the insiders’
power in wage setting (Lindbeck and Snower 1988). In addition, union members are inflation
averse, reflecting, for instance, negative effects of inflation on the real value of social
benefits, pensions, or nominal assets of union members (Cubitt 1992, Scott 1997).
By construction, the labor union in sector i is Stackelberg leader vis-à-vis the central
bank. That is, labor unions take the rate of inflation and how their wage setting influences
inflation into account when determining their wage demands. In a fully symmetric
equilibrium (where  j ij w w = ), the wage reaction function of unions in country 1 is 
4
( ) [ ]
( )( ) ( )
2
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 2 2 1 1
1 1 s c s s n a
s c s n a s w s n
w
q + q - q -
q - q - q + q -
= .
(6)
                                                
4 The focus is on country 1. Results for country 2 are similar and can be obtained by substituting indices.7
The reaction function illustrates that wages in both member countries are strategic
complements only to a point: when inflation aversion is large enough, unions fear that wage
demands from the other country will prompt the central bank into an inflationary response
that should be avoided (or limited) by lowering their own wage demands. Thus, inflation
aversion works as a disciplining force on labor unions.
Based on (6) we can calculate the equilibrium nominal wage demand in country 1:
( )( ) ( )
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(7)
Equilibrium wages in country 1 are determined by the labor market structure in both
economies (measured by nj), the degree of inflation aversion of unions in both countries (c),
the central bank characteristics determining inflation (q), and the distribution of political
power in the monetary policy decision-making process (sj). For values of s1 close to 1,
nominal wage demands can be shown to be decreasing in c and be increasing in the number of
national labor unions (for c > 0).
3. Inflation and Real Wages in Member Countries
Combining nominal wage demands in the two countries, the rate of inflation can be calculated
from (4) as:
( )( ) ( )( )
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(8)8
Not surprisingly, equation (8) mirrors equilibrium nominal wages. The influence of
the unions’ inflation aversion hinges on the relative weights of the two countries and their
respective labor market structures. This is also true for real wages, defined as  p - = j j w w ˆ :
( )( )( ) ( )
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- q + q - q - q -
= .
(9)
In equilibrium, real wages are similar to nominal wage demands except that the inflationary
response by the central bank, moderating changes in real wages by a factor ( ) q - 1 . Taking
partial derivatives shows that the real wage in country 1 is
•  increasing in n1:  a less centralized labor market in country 1  leads to higher wage
demands because wage setters become more oblivious to the inflationary consequences
of their action for the economy as a whole.
•  decreasing in n2: the implied increase in foreign wages triggers an inflationary response
from the central bank. Since labor unions in country 1 are inflation averse, the increase
in inflation will only partly be compensated through higher nominal wage demands.
•  decreasing in c: making unions in countries 1 and 2 more inflation-averse will lead to
lower nominal wages. Monetary policy will only partly accommodate this move by
lowering inflation, resulting in higher real wages.
4. Voting Power, Inflation, and the Real Sector
Assume, without loss of generality, an economically symmetric currency union with
2 / 1 2 , 1 = = c = g s . In this setting, the representation of countries 1 and 2 in the common
central bank based on the “one country, one vote” principle would be “ideal” in the sense that
their political weight would exactly match their respective economic weight. With a9
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How would a more asymmetric distribution of voting power—more akin to what we
observe in reality—influence inflation and the real sector? It turns out that the answer is far
from straightforward (see Appendix 1). But a helpful thought experiment can shed light on
the issue: consider the case of extreme asymmetry between the two countries; that is, assume
that s1 goes to unity while s2 approaches zero.
6 In this scenario, the condition for asymmetric
voting rights to reduce inflation compared to symmetric voting rights, i.e., 
2 1 2 1 s s s s = „ p < p , is














For  0 > q , a sufficient condition for (11) to be fulfilled is  3 / 2 1 > n n , that is, the number of
unions in country 1 should exceed the number of unions in country 2 by a significant degree.
We conclude that an increase in one country’s political weight beyond its economic
weight could decrease inflation if: (i) that country’s labor market is not too centralized
compared to that of the other country and (ii) the central bank’s reaction to wage increases is
strong. In such a scenario, the council will aim to increase inflation to lower (the relatively
high) unemployment in country 1. As a consequence, unions in country 1 will be inclined to
                                                
5 Note that inflation aversion causes the externality between unions (Grüner and Hefeker 1999). Otherwise,
unions fully internalize the effect of the changed environment, leading to similar inflation under both regimes.10
moderate their wage demands. At the same time, unions in country 2 will be increasing
wages—but only to some degree. While there is an incentive to increase wages as the central
bank pays less attention to labor market developments in country 2, unions are more sensitive
to higher inflation from the increased weight of country 1. The latter effect moderates wage
demands in country 2. As a consequence, overall currency union inflation could be falling.
Vice versa, increasing the voting weight of a country with highly centralized labor markets
could lead to an increase in inflation.
Is there a similar result for unemployment? Following the same approach, we find that
the condition for unemployment in country 1 to decrease when we compare the asymmetric
voting scenario with the symmetric scenario i.e., 
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Observe that the right-hand-side of the expression is increasing in a but decreasing in c and q.
Regarding the labor market structure, also note that a necessary condition for (12a) to be
fulfilled is  2 1 n n > , that is, that country 1’s labor market is less centralized than country 2’s.
We conclude that an increase in country 1’s political weight beyond its economic
weight could decrease unemployment in country 1 if: (i) country 1’s labor market is less
centralized compared to country 2’s; (ii) unions are less averse to unemployment than to
inflation; and (iii) the central bank’s reaction to wage increases is strong. Vice versa,
increasing the voting weight of a country with highly centralized labor markets, so that
2 1 n n < ,  could lead to an increase in unemployment in that country.
                                                
6 For instance, we could assume that b = 0 (i.e., a zero bargaining weight for the ECB board) while gﬁ1 (i.e., the
relative weight of country 1’s representative in the council approaches unity).
7 See Appendix 2 for the general condition.11
Taking into account the above result on inflation, it would seem that there is a
plausible scenario in which country 1 will be strictly better off after a central bank reform
strengthening its political representation in the council. Note that this result does not require
differences in business cycles or preferences but is driven solely by union behavior and labor
market asymmetries.
How does country 2 fare with the decrease in its voting power in the council?
Assuming that s2 approaches zero, we find that 
2 1 2 s s u „  always exceeds 
2 1 2 s s u = because
condition (12b)—which is related to (12a) but shows the condition for unemployment to
increase—is always fulfilled:
( )( )( ) ( ) 0 2 / 2 2 / 1
2
1 2 1 > q q - + q - q - q - n c n n a . (12b)
To summarize, a decrease in country 2’s political weight below its economic weight is
likely to increase unemployment in country 2. The intuition behind this result is simply that,
from the unions’ perspective, reducing country 2’s weight in the council to zero renders
inflation exogenous, undermining the incentive to moderate wage demands to keep inflation
low.
8
As a consequence, the government in country 2 faces a trade off between
unemployment and inflation: while a reduction in voting rights tends to bring down inflation,
it is also likely to hurt employment. Nevertheless, if decision makers in country 2 are
sufficiently conservative in the sense that they prefer the post-reform inflation/unemployment
outcome to the pre-reform outcome (for instance, because of high levels of inflation), they are
                                                
8 Of course, unions will discipline their wage demands to keep unemployment low, but the additional incentive
to lower wage demands to restrain inflation low is lost. Thus, the three-dimensional trade-off between wages,
unemployment, and inflation is changed, allowing higher wage demands.12
likely to support a decrease of their voting power in the council below the country’s economic
weight.
5. Some Preliminary Evidence and Discussion
An implication of the theoretical considerations above is that there could be a link between
labor market structure and voting power in the ECB council. Recall that an increase in voting
power in excess of a country’s economic weight should hold greater attraction for countries
with less centralized labor markets that hope to reduce unemployment. In other words, if the
observed distribution of voting weights in the ECB council were influenced by similar
arguments, we should expect a negative correlation between unemployment and voting power
in excess of a country’s economic weight. Along the same line, excess voting power should
be negatively correlated with measures of centralization. Table 1 provides some—albeit very
crude—measures for the latter, as well as indicators of excess voting power within the council
and unemployment figures for current EMU members.
The indicators collected in Table 1 suggest that there is indeed some evidence of a
negative relationship between excess voting power and unemployment. On average, countries
which are currently politically overrepresented in the ECB council compared to their
economic weight show lower unemployment rates than countries that are underrepresented
(see lower panel). Moreover, while the small number of observations and the lack of other
controls demand caution in interpreting such results, the conjectured negative relationship is
also present in the negative coefficient of correlation of about –0.4. The findings regarding
centralization are less supportive. On average, overrepresented and underrepresented
countries show similar degrees of centralization, and there is no trace of a negative
relationship (the coefficient of correlation is small but positive) between centralization and13
excess voting power in the council.
9 Nevertheless, we tentatively conclude that the data does
not allow rejection of the idea that the current distribution of voting rights in the ECB council
could, among other influences, reflect labor market characteristics as suggested in Section 4.













Germany 5.6 30.3 -24.8 2.0 8.6
France 5.6 21.4 -15.9 2.0 8.7
Italy 5.6 17.9 -12.3 2.0 9.0
Spain 5.6 9.5 -4.0 2.0 11.3
Netherlands 5.6 6.2 -0.7 3.0 2.7
Belgium 5.6 3.8 1.8 2.0 7.3
Austria 5.6 3.1 2.5 3.0 4.3
Finland 5.6 2.0 3.6 2.0 9.1
Greece 5.6 1.9 3.6 n.a. 10.0
Portugal 5.6 1.8 3.8 3.0 5.1
Ireland 5.6 1.7 3.9 1.0 4.4
Luxembourg 5.6 0.3 5.2 n.a. 2.8
Average of countries underrepresented („Difference“ < 0): 2.2 8.1
Average of countries overrepresented („Difference“ > 0): 2.2 6.1
Correlation between the respective column and „Difference: 0.18 -0.43
Sources: OECD; IFS; Riboud et al. (2002); Berger (2002); and own calculations.
Notes: “Political weight” takes into account votes allocated to the EXB board, “economic weight” is based on
GDP, and the “difference” subtracts the latter from the former, making it a measure of excess voting power. The
“centralization index” measures the degree of wage bargaining centralization (with higher figures indicating
higher degrees of centralization).
Are there policy implications regarding EMU enlargement? It is interesting to note
that labor market centralization in relevant accession countries seems to fall short of the
current EMU average. Riboud et al. (2002) report that the mean centralization index for
Poland, The Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, The Slovak Republic, and Estonia is about
1.8 compared to the 2.2 measured for today’s EMU members (Table 1). Based on the
                                                
9 Labor market characteristics are notoriously hard to measure, and the low variance of the OECD’s
centralization indicator might be one of the reasons for this result. We also experimented with other indicators.
There is, for instance, a positive correlation of about 0.5 between union coverage and the “difference” indicator
in Table 1. To the extent that union coverage is a positive function of the number of unions active in a country
(and, thus, perhaps indicative of less centralized wage negotiations), this finding seems to support the model.14
theoretical arguments developed in section 4, one might conclude that these countries will
(and perhaps should) be inclined to enter the currency union with voting rights exceeding
their economic size. At the same time, it is far from clear whether current members would
benefit from seeing their voting rights being reduced to accommodate such a suggestion.
As argued earlier, the willingness to accept voting rights short of relative economic
size will, among other things, reflect present member’s view of the unemployment/inflation
tradeoff. With inflation around 2 percent or below, many current EMU members might find
themselves unwilling to trade in even lower inflation for higher unemployment. This could
help to explain why a majority of current members supports ECB reform that would protect
the voting rights of current members. In addition, the potentially conflicting interest between
current and future EMU members complicates policy conclusions. While one is tempted to
speculate that the present asymmetrical vote distribution within the ECB council might have
been in the best interest of all involved, a further increase in the overrepresentation of smaller
member countries with enlargement might not.
6. Concluding Remarks
The likely enlargement of EMU has put the distribution of voting rights in the ECB council
into the spotlight. In contrast to, for instance, the U.S. Federal Reserve or the pre-1999
German Bundesbank, voting rights in the ECB council are distributed according to the “one
country, one vote” principle and independent of economic size. This potentially leaves
smaller countries, including most potential EMU newcomers, a majority in the council. It has
been argued that this might bias ECB decision making (by putting too large a weight on
economic developments in these smaller countries) if national central bank governors hold
national interests dearer to their hearts than the euro area aggregate.
So was the present ECB framework wrong in enforcing the “one country, one vote”
principle at the neglect of economic size? There are reasons not to jump to conclusions.15
Adding to arguments resting on central bank independence or diversity in monetary
transmission, we have argued that differences in labor market structure could play a role in
explaining the existing vote distribution. In a model where monetary policy has real effects
because labor unions internalize the inflationary consequences of wage setting, deviating from
a pure seize-based voting scheme has different consequences for unemployment depending on
the structure of national labor markets. Those overrepresented could benefit in terms of lower
unemployment, especially if characterized by relatively decentralized or competitive labor
markets. On the other hand, larger member countries, which are underrepresented within the
present ECB voting framework, are likely to be confronted with less positive labor market
outcomes. Nevertheless, such an arrangement could be in their interest to the extent that they
take a conservative view on the inflation-unemployment trade-off. The reason is that inflation
is likely to decline compared to a situation where voting rights are tailored to match economic
weights. Preliminary evidence does not allow falsifying the notion that such considerations
could be reflected in the present distribution of voting rights within the ECB council.
One implication of these results is that simply readjusting voting rights to decrease
asymmetries by reducing the underrepresentation of EMU’s larger member countries could
entail costs. In particular, a large county with a highly centralized labor market structure
might be facing both higher unemployment and inflation as its voting weight increases. This
calls for some caution in reducing the current allocation of voting rights.
Does this imply that current plans for ECB reform are ill advised? This might be a
question of perspective and the labor market characteristics of the countries involved. Without
reform, the planned addition of up to ten mostly small countries to the euro area is bound to
further increase existing asymmetries between voting rights and economic size. However,
many of these future members are characterized by relatively decentralized labor markets
which—according to the model—should help them profit from overrepresentation. On the
other hand, for existing (often larger) members a further reduction in representation might not16
be as beneficial. This is because, with inflation already low by historical standards, the benefit
of added wage discipline and inflation is less likely to compensate a potential increase in
unemployment. Thus any policy conclusion regarding ECB reform prior to EMU enlargement
will have to trade off welfare gains and losses in different member states.
Appendix 1: Comparison of inflation rates
Comparing equations (8) and (10) yields:
( ) ( ) ( )( )] [ 2 / 2 2 1 1 2 1
2 s n s n a n n a c q - q - q - + q




1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1
2 q - q - q - + q - + q - - q n n a n n a c s n s n s s s s c





2 2 s n s s n s n n a c q - + q - q - q - q .
(A1)
The condition is not obviously fulfilled or not fulfilled. Setting s1=1 gives expression (11).
Appendix 2: Comparison of unemployment
The condition for unemployment in country 1 to be lower with asymmetric voting rights is:
( )( )( ) ( ) 2 / 1 2 / 1 1 1 2 2 2 - q - q - q - - s n s n n a
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 1
2 2 / s n n n s n s n s s c q - + - - q -  < 0. (A2)
Note that the sign of the first term depends on whether s1 is smaller or larger than ½. For the
second term, the sign depends on the differences  2 1 1 2 n s n s -  and which country holds more
political power. For instance, a sufficient condition for condition (A2) to be fulfilled is
2 1 2 / 1 s s > >  and  ( ) 2 1 2 1 /s s n n > . Setting s1=1 yields expression (12a).17
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